Afrika in Focus Special: Review of 2025 Feat. Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Kenya

The past year across Africa delivered sharp turns in politics, conflict, and economic strategy, challenging easy narratives and forcing a rethink of power and priorities. Tanzania’s election controversy reignited debates about democratic backsliding, as opposition figures were sidelined and protests met force. Kenya’s public anger over living costs swelled into nationwide demonstrations, putting President Ruto’s agenda under relentless pressure. Rwanda remained efficient and orderly yet authoritarian, prompting questions about what a post-Kagame era could look like. These stories are not isolated; they feed into a broader reckoning over legitimacy, accountability, and how governance aligns with the aspirations of young, restless populations who expect both stability and voice.

Amid these political shifts, two overlooked wars escalated with devastating human tolls. Sudan’s civil war morphed into one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, displacing millions while drawing scant sustained coverage. In eastern DRC, more than a hundred militias tangled across mineral-rich provinces, where coltan, cobalt, and gold make the region vital to smartphones, batteries, and clean-energy supply chains. This fusion of conflict and commerce highlights a central paradox of globalisation: high-tech progress is often underwritten by insecurity at the source. 

Southern Africa faced its own reckoning around land and legacy. More than three decades after apartheid, land ownership in South Africa still skews heavily toward a white minority, fuelling a renewed push for expropriation with limited compensation in specific cases like abandoned land. The policy debate drew international heat, sanctions, and polarised rhetoric, but it also rekindled essential questions: what does just redress look like, how do you avoid market collapse, and how can land reform promote productivity, not merely symbolism?

The most consequential geopolitical move came from the Sahel—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—where the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) signalled a decisive break from external reliance. With a joint command, shared doctrine, and overt security alignment, the bloc framed sovereignty as both message and method. Critics see risky militarisation; supporters call it overdue autonomy after years of interventions that didn’t deliver security. What gives the AES heft is not only posture but policy: Niger’s oil-led surge, Mali’s lithium opening, and Burkina Faso’s push to refine gold at home point to a development model aimed at retaining value.

2026 promises to be a fascinating year with key elections taking place , Tanzania and Kenya at serious crossroads and will THE AES survive another year or will external forces destroy it!! 

Chapters

• 0:03 Welcome And Year-In-Review Setup
• 0:42 Subscribe, Follow, And Support
• 3:05 Thanks And 2026 Programming Preview
• 3:53 Tanzania’s Disputed Election And Crackdown
• 7:28 Kenya’s Cost Of Living Protests And Politics
• 10:30 Kagame’s Rwanda And The Succession Question
• 13:35 Sudan’s Civil War And Media Blind Spots
• 16:49 Eastern DRC: Minerals, Militias, And Displacement
• 19:42 Southern Africa’s Land Battles And US Sanctions
• 24:26 Sahel Realignment: The AES Is Born
• 27:13 Rising Jihadist Violence And Regional Spillover
• 30:00 New Alliances: Russia, Turkey, And Caution
• 33:41 Niger’s Growth Boom And Oil Surge
• 36:17 Mali’s Lithium, Gold, And Agriculture Push
• 38:59 Burkina Faso’s Gold Refining And Energy Plans

Transcript

SPEAKER_00: 0:03

Good afternoon. Welcome to this edition of Africa in Focus with myself Kwame, a Ghanaian broadcaster, journalist, writer, historian, podcaster, and entrepreneur. And in this edition of Africa in Focus, it's a little back review at the key events that happened across African content in 2025. So there's ups and downs and some very, very interesting uh stories uh from the content uh in 2025 uh that we're gonna uh highlight in our end-of-view review for 2025. Before we get there, just to make aware that if you like what you hear, uh please share to your friends, family, social media networks. Uh, please subscribe to Ghana African Fakes on YouTube, uh, hit the notification bell, uh, meaning that every time we upload a new podcast, YouTube notifies you. Similarly, uh, you can get us on Spotify, look out for Ghana African Fakes on Spotify, and hit the follow button, meaning that every time we upload on Spotify, uh, Spotify will notify you of that. So please subscribe to Ghana African Fakes on YouTube or on Spotify. Okay, and if you like to donate to the show uh to help us continue to produce some more great um programming for you from Africa and from the content, you can donate as little as three US dollars a month. Uh, it can be a one-of-payment or a monthly subscription. So if you'd like to donate uh to the show, uh, I'll leave you the link where you can donate uh to the show. All right, so let's get into this. But before we do rather, uh, thank you for all those who followed me, tuned in, uh, downloaded the stream, streamed it, uh Ghana African Focus last year, 2025. We've had great success, uh, particularly if you interest on Spotify. Uh, the majority of you do. So we had uh great uh feedback from Spotify, and uh thank you to all those who made uh Ghana African Focus one of the top shows, uh, particularly in Ghana as well. All right, so for 2026 this year, we've got a lot of great um content for you coming both from Africa and from Ghana. So we've got a lot of interviews, we've got a lot of features, and also you know, if we're lucky, we may interview uh somebody um quite influential. So we've got a lot of packed uh programming for you in 2026. So keep out, or rather, stay tuned, to Africa, Ghana, African Focus 2026, because we've got a lot to cover for you this year. So let's move on to a show uh highlighting uh the review review 2025 as far as the African content is concerned. So we start in Tanzania. So uh Tanzania experienced a lot of political instability in 2025. Uh Sulu Hassan uh became the president after the um, I would say, I won't say assassination, but let's say the death of the former president John Pombe Magafri in 2023. And so elections took place this year uh because um the mandate uh had run out because Magafuri won the elections in 2020, uh 2020, yeah, and had another five years too. So the five years came to an end this year, and Sluhua Hassan uh, who became president because she was vice president under Magafuri, she then took over the reins when Magafuri died in 2023. So elections were called in Tanzania, but because of the nature of this particular uh person, she basically annulled the opposition, so the opposition were barred for for every reason um from staging the elections or participating in the elections, and she won the election with a whopping 97.66 percent of the vote, you know, and this sparked you know a lot of um unrest and outrage within Tanzania, and um, you know, if you look at you know reports across the African content and also on Reuters, etc., you know, as part of this so-called election process, as I mentioned, the opposition have been silenced. Uh, there's also media censorship and also uh absence of many, many international observers. And so, you know, uh, there was an upcry, uproar in um Tanzania, and uh people were killed, unfortunately. Uh, those people who actually rose up again this against this um, you know, Sulu Hassan, uh calling in essence, being a dictatorship, because she has annulled the opposition, and you know, there's also militantship as well, and so you know, many people protest in the streets, and because people protested, which is a democratic right of any free society to do, which is the right to protest. Unfortunately, Sahan uh Saluh Hassan didn't agree to this or didn't like this, and so she sent the army to uh you know curtail those protests, which unfortunately resulted in many deaths. So, you know, the gains the gains economically that were made under John Pampa Mogafuri, even though Maghuri had his critics, you know, there was stability in the country, and there's also definitely economic transformation and industrialization going on under Magfuri. So it seems like those gains that were apparent under John Maghuri have now been eroded under the leadership, or some would argue the leadership of Samara Sluhu Hassan. And the current environment is now a police state. We have people that are actually literally in hiding as we speak, you know, for fear of reprisal for speaking out against the authoritarian style of leadership of Samira Slehu Hassan. So Tanzania is definitely you know one to watch out for this year. Does she uh you know um you what's the word I'm looking for? The word is does she actually um have a hold, have a third group on power, or are the people able to amount a uh you could say insurrection in order for there to be free and fair elections within Tanzania? So watch out for Tanzania in 2026, uh, will prove to be an interesting story throughout this year. Now we move to Kenya. Um, you know, Ruto has ruled Kenya since 2023, and he's he's proven to be very, very popular among the Kenyan uh electorate who had high hopes when Ruto replaced uh Uhuba Kenyatta as parents of Kenya. Now, throughout 2025, you know, uh there's been issues to do with the high cost of living in Kenya. There have been many protests in the streets regarding this also, and also, you know, the opposition has been mobilized. The so-called Rimbo coalition has been mobilized, and on that, you know, um last year, 2025, saw the death of longtime Kenyan opposition leader Ray Lodenga. He died, I think, June or July of last year. So uh his Rainbow coalition has been able to mobilize uh public uh pressure on Ruto, and they've brought out a lot of people in the streets of Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major cities across Kenya to protest about the high cost of living and also uh the taxes and debt that Kenya is currently swelled or mired in. And so, you know, this year uh there's been an active opposition towards Bruto, which has caused political tensions within the country, particularly over his style of governance, and uh also the way how Kenya is going uh is not really acceptable to the majority of Kenyans. So even though there are elections in 2027, uh the general thing is that you know the majority of Kenyans cannot wait until 2027 because the way Ru2 is taking Kenya, um you know, uh the the the the the the the spiral or the trajectory in which we are taking kenya, even to the extent that apparently he sold he has sold you know medical records of of Kenyans to a Euro-American third party. That's caused massive uproar in Kenya this year. So, you know, again, as the time is near, look out for Kenya in 2026. Can we survive uh uh you know the uh pressure uh that is amassing in terms of the public pressure and also in terms of the um opposition in in Kenya being able to organize and memorize itself and are the ordering citizenship gonna take their hands or destiny to their own hands and do what happened in the so-called Arab Spring and what happened in you know um Bangladesh when leaders of those countries were deposed by popular revolt? So again, you know, 2026 promises to be a very, very interesting year in Kenya. Now you move on to Rwanda and Kagame. So as I mentioned, you know, I had a podcast about 2023, 2024, marking 30 years of the aftermath of the uh genocide in Rwanda, and I mentioned well tired it, Kagame Saint-Osina. You know, uh even though Kagame has brought great great progress to Rwanda in terms of infrastructure, in terms of development, in terms of a country that is easy to do business with, you know, and there's no red tape, corruption is virtually zero, etc. However, you know, Rwanda is a police state, so to speak, and uh also Kagame, you know, Rwanda is a de facto one-party state with Kagame, uh uh uh Rwanda patriotic force ruling the country with an iron rod. And so, you know, uh there is mountain, you know, anticipation within Rwanda and outside of Rwanda as to what happens to Rwanda when Kagame either steps down or you know brings in successor because Kigami has ruled uh Rwanda for 30 plus years. He's now about 60 in the 60s, I believe, and cannot go on and on forever. And so, you know, with many African leaders, you know, like Paul B in Cameroon, like uh the late Robin Mugabe in Zimbabwe, uh Alasan Batawa in La Côte d'Ivoire, um Fedor Obiang in the Kiturogini, these so-called leaders, most of whom are over 80, are still in the country. So, you know, is Kagame gonna rule Rwanda until he's 80, in his 80s, or is he going to hand over power to a younger person? You know, there's rumors that he may hand power to his son or somebody within the um RPF. We don't know that, but about that. So we'll watch and see. But you know, Rwanda is also facing mountain criticism for its war in DL Congo, and I'll come on to that in a minute. And even this year, I'll do a special regarding the war in DR Congo and why you, particularly you if you own an iPhone or any iPod, you are complicit in the suffering and genocide going on in DL Congo. But like I said, you know, we'll be doing that um probably later on this month, or yeah, later on in January. So um look out for that. So, you know, again, 2026 promises to be a very, very interesting year in Rwanda, and we see what happens to Kagame as uh his iron fist rule on that country. Now, we look at a couple of conferences you know that have you know played the content over the last couple of years, and uh, you know, these conflicts have literally had no or little uh view or say on the global western media as compared to Gaza, as compared to Ukraine. Now these conflicts are these conflicts are the conflict in Sudan and the conflict in DRC. Yeah, so how many of you are aware of the conflict in Sudan? Yeah, so this this uh civil war in Sudan, and again I'll go into in a bit more detail uh later on in the month or in February. Um, you know, it is now a full-blown civil war, which has been ongoing since 2023, and you've got two uh parties to this war as per usual. So you've got the the SAF, the Sudanese Armed Forces, which is a national army, and they're having a fight between the rebels, which is called the RSF, Rapid Support Forces, which is a powerful power major group that is sponsored and backed by uh Qatar. Okay, so the war this year, 2025, well last year 2025, escalated dramatically, uh, spreading from Khartoum in the north to Dafour in the south, and now Kordafan and the RSF, which is which is the the the the the criminals, the terrorists backed by Qatar have seized oil fields and major cities, while the SAF, which is the government army, has relied heavily on airstrikes. So, uh as a result of this three-year civil war, over 12 million Africans have been displaced inside Sudan. Nearly 150,000 deaths have occurred since 2023, mainly women and young children. And the United Nations calls it the world's largest humanitarian crisis today. Yeah, but none of you know about this because you know Western media and even African media have failed to report properly and do a deep analysis on the war in Sudan, which is, as the United Nations calls it, the world's largest humanitarian crisis, not Gaza, not Ukraine, but Sudan is the world's largest humanitarian crisis, and yet African Union remains evilly silent. Yeah, it's about Sudan, but like I said, I go into detail on that uh sometime in February. Now let's focus on the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly Eastern Congo, and that's been ongoing since 2024. So the Democratic Republic of Congo has is facing one of the world's, if not the world's, largest dispersion crisis. Fighting intensified this year, especially due to the M23 Rebel Group, which has captured major cities, including Goma and Bokouva in early 2025. So who's behind it? You know, uh the M23 rebels is the is the main armed group driving the current escalation, and the Democratic Republic of Congo's government forces are struggling to contain M23's advances. Yeah. Now apparently, and this is what makes this war so intractable and so difficult, is that over a hundred militia groups operate in Eastern DRC. Yeah, and Eastern DRC is the richest part of land in this world because that is the richest part of Congo, which is part of the world, because it contains precious minerals like Kaltan, coal bat, lithium, used to make electric cars, used to make LED batteries, used to make fridge freezers, used to make smart computers, used to make smart cars. These precious minerals are there in Eastern DLC, alongside you know, gold, diamonds, silver, yeah, and we know gold is now at record prices. So this is what's even making this war more intransient, yeah. And you know, like I said, I'll go into detail, you know, in the next few weeks, but the humanitarian impact on this war is that as of late 2024, early into 2025, 7.3 million, sorry, 7.8 million African people have been internally displaced because of this war. Yeah. In the last couple of months alone, more than 7,000 Africans have been killed. Yeah, and nearly 1 million refugees are in neighboring countries, i.e., South Sudan itself, which is experiencing a war, you know, Kenya as well. So that's just a snapshot of two of the most pressing uh conflicts within the African country continent that has escalated and gone to more dangerous terrain uh this year. But like I said, I go into detail this year on these two conflicts. Now, let's move on to Southern Africa. Again, most of you are not aware that that there are massive, massive land disputes all over Southern Africa. South Africa itself, which I come on to, Zimbabwe, Botswana. Namibia, Mozambique, yeah, where Europeans have seized the majority of those lands, yeah. So Namibia. 70% of the land is controlled by Europeans, particularly Germans. In Botswana, half the land is controlled by white people. In Zimbabwe, you know, because of the sanctions put on the country, you know, the the land that Mugabe took back from the uh Europeans, particularly British, Manangagwa ashamedly, ashamedly, Manangagwa um has given back some of the land that was that was quote unquote given to uh Mugabe and also it's paid compensation as we know it to the tune of something like 3.5 billion um dollars to some of the white farmers whose so-called land was taken away from them. But South Africa is the biggest one. So more than 30 years after the end of um white minority rule within uh South Africa, right, more than 75% of the land is in white hands, yeah. And because of this, you know, um the AEC who lost last year's election and had to go into opposition with parties they didn't like, yeah the the A the AEC now has now done a policy called the expropriation act that was signed in January 25. Now this act, yeah, 2025 is an update on land laws for the first time in nearly 50 years. Yeah, so the act allows land expropriation for public purposes, possibility of zero compensation in specific cases, i.e., abandoned or unused land. Now, this has caused so much uproar, particularly in the Western world, particularly in right wing, ultra-right wing nationalist movements in the United States, particularly, that this year Donald Trump put an embargo on South Africa citing so-called white genocide in South Africa. Yeah, and if you recall, I did do a podcast this year, or last year rather, about the case of a white genocide, Murphy Reality. And even white Dutch people, so-called Africanist, they even just admit that Trump's assertion of white genocide is a false narrative is a false narrative. But apparently, because of this act, you know, South Africa uh has been banned by a has put sanctions by the United States and South Africa and has allowed um so-called white Afrikaners to come into the US to seek uh so-called asylum. So this year, saw about 50,000 um white Dutch people, so-called Afrikaners, uh, seek political refugee in um the US. And apparently, no African person under the on the under Trump's um you know initiative, so so to speak, is allowed to seek refugee in in uh in the US because according to Trump, there's a white genocide in uh South Africa. And also, because of this tension between South Africa and the US, the United States, under Trump, boycotted the recent G20 summit that was held in Johannesburg, I believe it was October, October, September, October time, you know, and the next G20 summit, which is actually this year, going to build in Florida. Uh, Trump has banned any delegation from South Africa to attend this conference. So, you know, it's very interesting that, you know, and Trump didn't seem to understand this that the land that white people have in South Africa was stolen. Stolen land based on the 1913 so-called Native Land Act, where white people stole, expropriated land from the indigenous African people. And you can go and Google it. So, yeah, so this is not propaganda or a rant, this is factual history, fact, yeah, 1913 so-called native land act. Go and Google it, yeah. And Trump needs to understand this, yeah. So there's no white genocide in South Africa because, like I said, the majority of the land and more importantly, the economy is in white hands. So, how the hell does Trump assert that there's a white genocide going on in South Africa, right? Unless there's an ulterior motive. So that's again, South Africa promises to be a very, very interesting story this year, and watch out for that. So you move on to perhaps the biggest uh development in 25 as far as the African continent is concerned, and that is the Maghreb region. Well, we don't call it the Maghreb, we don't even call it the Sahel, you know. We as countries Africans call it the Wagadougou because that area, Burkina Faso, Mali, um, and Niger, that landmass covers the old Ghana Empire, and the ruler of the Ghana Empire was called the Wagodougou. So that's why, as African scholars or African centrists, we refer to that landmass not as the Sahel, but as the Wagadougou. And so there's been some very, very interesting venoms um this year going on in the so-called Sahel. So we're going to tell you a bit more about that because you know, these three countries, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, yeah, this year they formed the alliance of Sahel State, AES, and officially launched a joint military force. Now, this was not just a press release for press release stake, right? This was a full military bloc with a unified battalion, shared command structure, and a clear message that we will defend ourselves with or without ECHOS, with or without the West. Yeah, and the launch happened in Bamako at the AES summit just a month ago, December 2025. All three leaders were present: Ibrahim Chore or Burkina Faso, Guayter of Mali, and the other leader of Niger. Yeah, so all three states signaled the same thing. It's a break from the old order. So for decades, yeah, the circles of hell relied on foreign military support from France, the EU, and the US. But 2025 marked the moment that Julian said, we are charting our own path. We are taking control of our destiny and we are self-determinating our future. So now, whether this block 6 fails will shape West Africa potentially for the next decade and even the next 20 years.

SPEAKER_01: 27:57

Yeah.

SPEAKER_00: 27:58

So this is a very, very important development this year because these three countries now have formed the AES and composite within that is a military unit that has a central command. That is saying that if you touch one, you touch all of this. Yeah, yeah. And they're sending us Johnson because we know that you know ECOWAS at one time wanted to invade one of these countries, and particularly Nigeria, that was the uh um had a presidency of the AU over the last year, wanted to go in there and send Nigerian troops, but that was uh backed down by the majority of Nigerians and also the uh Nigerian Senate, most of whom have family links to countries like Nigeria. So it tells you now the ECOWAS, you know, the so-called economic community of West African states is now a fractured body and a body that essentially, you know, is a bankrupt body. It's more of a Western puppet. However, despite this good news, but we'll bring some more on that good news in terms of what's happened this year. Violence in the um circles to hell, we call it Wagadougou, is on the rise. So, groups into Al-Qaeda and ISIS have intensified attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. 2025 saw more attacks on civilians, more pressure on rural communities, and more attempts to encircle Mesities. Yeah, and the dangerous expansion towards coastal parts of West Africa, including La Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, and even Ghana. So we've got to be careful, uh, as West sub-region, that this jihadist violence does not spill into all parts of West Africa. So in Mali, Timbuktu region, violence spiked dramatically in late 2025. In Burkina Faso, entire rural zones remain contested. Yeah, and theurist forces are fighting viciously with those jihadists who, by the way, are sponsored by the West and also by these Arab states like Qatar and the OA and the Qatar and the UAE. Yeah. In Niger, the Talibieri and Tahar regions saw renewed pressure. So this is not just about terrorism, this is about competition for governance, and this is about trying to undo the good work that's been going on in the Sahel. Yeah. So what we can say is that the Sahel or the Waggadougou is no longer a security problem, it's potentially a stated problem.

SPEAKER_01: 31:08

Yeah.

SPEAKER_00: 31:11

Another major system in 2025 amongst the Waggadugu, circle Sahel, was political realignment. So the AES has essentially distanced itself from ECOWAS, accusing ECOWAS of being close to Western interest and too quick to sanction military action. So at the same time, Mali, Burkina, Faso, and Niger have deepened their ties with Russia, who we know are providing military support, particularly to Burkina Faso, Turkey, and other and other non-Western partners. And this has become a bigger trend in West Africa this year. You know, countries now, you know, are beginning to diversify their lines, alliances, looking for partners who don't lecture them about governance but are ready to support them and give them, treat them like partners as opposed to a slave. And so what we're seeing this year, particularly among the Sahel uh countries, is you know looking out for their interests by forming alliances with other like-minded countries. Now, now for me personally, I don't particularly like Russia being involved because Russia has its own agenda in Africa that's not necessarily pro-African, yeah. And like I said before, a white man is a white man is a white man. Then came over Eastern European, Western European, Central European, Northern European, Southern European, Eastern European. They all think the same, they've all got the same kind of mentality. And so if I was Burkina Faso Maliniger, keep one eye open about Russia's intentions, because Russia's intentions may not be in the long run in your best interest, yeah, because we know obviously Russia has issues with the West, and uh, you know, Russia's fighting this war, not just Ukraine but the West as well, who are supplying Ukraine the weapons, and so Russia, you know, is seen as a price state by the West, but you know, and this is why Russia is looking for new markets, because obviously there's sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, and so Russia is looking for new markets. So Russia, you know, needs to be watched like a hawk. All right, so let's take some interesting finally on this uh wrap-up of the year. Let's take some interesting moves that are taking place in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. So Niger is the fastest growing economy in Africa in 2025. So, according to um the World Bank, Niger was the fastest growing economy in Africa with 14.4% GDP growth. And this comes from the oil sector, oil production quadrupled between 2023 and 2025. Now, check this production alone is expected to hit 30 million barrels in 2026, and oil revenues are a major driver of the growth boom that uh Niger has experienced this year. Also, the mining sector in the national nationalization of the mining companies has increased state revenues of Niger. So key minerals include uranium, gold, tin, and phosphorus. Again, agriculture, large-scale agriculture development, has been one of the three pillars of Niger's growth in this year. And agriculture helped reduce poverty by staggering 10% in 2025. So it tells you that you know, this so-called leadership in Niger is actually doing for the people and is actually, you know, uh seeing massive, massive growth without French and Western influence. Now, Mali, key development in Mali this year, mining. Mali has opened two lithium mines positioning itself in the global energy transition supply chain. Because, like I said, lithium is a key mineral that is used for electric cars, electric batteries. And this is where the West particularly is going, electric vehicles, and also many African countries are now shifting towards, unfortunately, electric vehicles rather than solar, but again, that's for another debate that we'll talk about later on the year. So Niger anticipating this lithium boom has opened two lithium mines. Also, Niger is also, I beg your pardon, Mali is also a massive gold producer. Yeah, again, in terms of oil and gas, Mali has its own oil and gas reserves and is expanding oil expiration activities that will bring in more revenue. Agriculture. Again, you know, Mali is also like Niger, investing wholesale in agriculture, and it's invested heavily in uh collaboration and also uh creating uh funds for farmers to grow food. So this is a great development within Mali this year. So in Bukina Faso, you know, Burkine Faso is the major gold producer, and they've been mining gold uh at record levels this year, and also they are near completion of a gold factory that will allow them to refine the gold in Burkina Faso while without taking the final finished product outside for it to be refined. Again, like Mali and Niger, Burkina Faso is shifting away from Western mining interests and has renegotiated new contracts with new partners, such as Russia, China, and some partners in the circle Middle East. This year also, Burkina Faso has invested massively in agriculture. As if as I mentioned earlier on the year, uh it I think it invested more than about 200 million dollars in agricultural products this year. So, you know, uh Burkina Faso is not a major oil producer, however, it is participating in the AES energy cooperation, which is a strategy to make the Wagado Waggaduk area circles to hell, energy sufficient. Yeah, because right now there's a war going on for energy, which is part or part of the Russia-Ukraine war, which is also which is also why Trump has seized Venezuela because of Venezuela's massive oil reserves. That's the reason why Trump went into Venezuela. I mean, taking out Mudu was just an excuse, but the real booty is Venezuela's massive oil reserves. Yeah? So this is why I'm talking about the energy um war, and the AES has positioned itself right in the center of energy cooperation. So, in wrapping up, you know, major AES projects include a regional bank, joint military force, and even media infrastructure, whereby it can promote its message of sovereignty, of unity, and self-determination, not just to the Wagodugu states, but the African continent and to the wider world. And so, watch out 2026. That will reveal some very, very interesting moves and policies that are going to shape not just the Sahel, the Circle Sahel region, but the entire West Africa sub-region that can have consequences for countries like Ghana, Nigeria, etc., who are also within the West Africa subregion. So 2026 promises to be a very, very fascinating year for the African content, and we will bring you news of those developments when they happen. So that's it for this week's edition of African Focus, looking back at the year 2025, as far as Africa was concerned, bringing you key stories from the content in 2025. We'll continue to bring you some more news from the content in 2026. So stay tuned for that. So for myself, coming from all the crew here on Ghana African Focus. Thank you for listening. Uh, we're gonna take a two week break now, but we will be back. Um, well, I was gonna take a break, but there's so much to do. So we'll be back next week for Ghana in Focus, looking at the airhead in Ghana, what our hopes and Anticipations are, our aspirations are for the year 2026 in Ghana, and we'll replay you some of John Muhammad's new year message to the Ghanaian people. So for myself, Kwame, from what the crew here on Africa in Focus is thank you for listening, and we'll see you in the next edition of Ghana, Africa in Focus.